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The strengths exhibited by the Samoan economy during the period 
of steady growth from 1998 to 2007 have since been tested by con-
siderable volatility in economic activity, declining employment, 
rapidly rising prices, the global financial crisis, and the September 
2009 tsunami. The economy has done reasonably well in the face 
of these challenges with key economic support in the form of aid, 
remittances and tourism. Questions are raised about the future 
viability of these forms of support.
The economy of Samoa has been subjected 
to severe shocks since the most recent 
economic update, in 2007. At the time of that 
update, Samoa had benefited from a decade 
of annual growth in real GDP—averaging 
3 per cent—accompanied by prudent fiscal 
and monetary policies. Yet, in a remarkably 
prescient caveat to this good performance, 
it was noted that
Samoa remains a small, geographically 
isolated and highly vulnerable island 
economy. Potential fiscal pressures 
from natural disasters, an ageing 
and diabetes-prone population, and 
possible resource flow constraints 
from effective graduation out of the 
least developed country status in 2010, 
are major medium-term risks facing 
the Samoan economy (Vaai 2007:1).
T h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  s m a l l n e s s 
and remoteness are fundamental for 
Samoa, although greater integration into 
industrialised-country labour markets 
through both settlement and seasonal 
migration provide some access to the higher 
paid work that scale and agglomeration 
economies allow. Samoa is ranked 207 
of the 219 least economically accessible 
countries in the world—calculated in terms 
of the distance to every other country and 
weighting these distances in terms of GDP 
(Gibson 2007). Thus, even as Samoa follows 
the recent advice of development experts 
for small, isolated and island countries to 
integrate more closely with their nearest 
large market (World Bank 2009), this 
integration process is unlikely to overcome 
fully the fundamental constraints of lack of 
scale and high distance costs.
8
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Economic survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university
Events in 2008, in the form of the 
global financial crisis (GFC), and in 2009, 
in the form of the devastating tsunami, also 
underscore the potential vulnerability of the 
Samoan economy. Critics of Pacific island 
countries’ closer integration—both amongst 
themselves and with the wider world 
economy—might consider the imported 
effects of a crisis that started with sub-prime 
mortgages in the United States as prima facie 
evidence of why freer movement of capital, 
goods and labour should be discouraged. 
Yet the impact of the GFC on economic 
activity in Samoa was relatively muted, with 
more of the recent volatility in economic 
activity, employment and fiscal outcomes 
reflecting domestic factors.
Moreover, the engagement of Samoa 
with the world economy helped considerably 
in dealing with the economic effects of the 
second major shock: the 2009 tsunami. While 
the generous response of aid donors—who 
contributed more than ST50 million—is 
most apparent, there was also important 
support provided by the two other main legs 
of the Samoan economy: remittances and 
tourism. In the year after the tsunami, there 
was only a small decline in tourism receipts, 
despite the devastation to some of the most 
iconic tourism destinations. The diaspora 
of overseas Samoans also responded very 
generously to Samoa’s needs following the 
tsunami, with remittances in the December 
quarter of 2009, immediately following 
the disaster, approximately ST25 million 
higher than the usual quarterly inflow 
of remittances. The tsunami affected 
approximately 5,000 people, so were 
these remittances to be received only by 
those affected they would amount to the 
replacement of one-third of average per 
capita income in the tsunami-affected region. 
While still a long way from full insurance, 
this ability of informal networks to respond 
to disasters reflects a fundamental strength 
of the Samoan economy and society.
Attention to these recent shocks—as 
important as they are—masks an important 
longer-term change. Economic activity 
in Samoa appears to be increasingly 
concentrated on construction, commerce, 
transport and communication, and public 
and private services. Much of this growth 
is centred on Apia and some also spills over 
into the Northwest Upolu region. Adjacent 
parts of this region appear as a continuation 
of the low-density, peri-urban settlement 
pattern of the Apia suburbs. These two 
areas—Apia and Northwest Upolu—also 
receive net inflows of people moving from 
elsewhere in Samoa. On the other hand, 
in Savaii and the rest of Upolu, average 
incomes appear lower and there is a net 
export of people to the rest of Samoa. It is 
not clear to what extent the tsunami damage 
and reconstruction effort will change this 
emerging gap.
Economic growth
The growth performance of the Samoan 
economy has been volatile over the past five 
years. Even before the start of the GFC in late 
2008 and the tsunami one year later, the rate 
of real GDP change varied between a low 
of –0.4 per cent in the June quarter of 2006 
and a peak of 10.6 per cent in the September 
quarter of 2007 (Figure 1). This volatility 
reflected the positive impact on GDP of the 
2007 South Pacific Games and several other 
major building projects. In fact, between 
September 2005 and December 2007, the rate 
of annual real growth in the construction 
sector averaged 13.2 per cent, while since 
March 2008 real GDP from construction has 
declined at an average rate of –2.2 per cent. 
The impact of this temporary boom is very 
clear—both from the new buildings in Apia 
and from the quarterly real GDP series in 
Figure 1, which went from ST264 million in 
March 2007 to ST290 million by December 
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2007 and then fell back to ST269 million by 
March 2008.
As a result of this construction-led 
growth, Samoa is a somewhat unexpected 
case where the volatility of real output has 
been less in the period since the GFC than 
it was before. The coefficient of variation 
(the standard deviation over the mean) of 
quarterly real output was 4.1 per cent from 
September 2005 until June 2008 and it has 
been only 1.6 per cent since then. Official 
documents such as the Fiscal Strategy 
Statement, Budget 2009/2010–2011/2012 
attribute the negative growth rate in 2008–09 
to the GFC adversely affecting fish exports 
and labour demand and exports from the 
EDS/Yazaki motor vehicle harness factory. 
But the two quarters when declines in real 
GDP were sharpest—with changes of –7 and 
–7.3 per cent, respectively, from 12 months 
earlier—were September and December 
2008, before there had been much impact 
from the GFC on the real sector of most 
economies. Hence, there also appear to 
be some home-grown contributors to the 
declining real GDP growth rates in Samoa.
The other recent feature of overall 
economic activity in Samoa is the declining 
importance of agriculture, fishing and 
manufacturing. The combined share for 
these sectors has fallen from about 27 per 
cent of real GDP in 2005 to just 20 per cent 
in 2010 (Figure 1). Since the starting and 
ending levels of real GDP were almost 
the same (ST261 million in the September 
quarter of 2005 and ST263 million in the June 
Figure 1 Real GDP, annual real GDP growth rate, and composition of real GDP, 
Samoa, 2005–10 (constant 2002 prices)
 
 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
180
200
220
240
260
280
300
Sep-05 Mar-06 Sep-06 Mar-07 Sep-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Sep-09 Mar-10
Pe
r c
en
t
R
ea
l G
D
P 
(Q
ua
rte
rly
, S
T$
 m
ill
io
n)
Real GDP (Left hand axis)
% from Agriculture, Fishing, Manufacturing (Right hand axis)
% change from 12 months ago (Right hand axis)
GFC Tsunami
Source: Samoa Bureau of Statistics (SBS), 2010. Gross Domestic Product June 2010, October, Samoa Bureau of 
Statistics, Apia.
10
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Economic survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university
quarter of 2010), this trend marks a decline 
in absolute terms. Thus, activity in the 
Samoan economy appears to be increasingly 
concentrated on construction, commerce, 
transport and communication, and public 
and private services. Casual observation 
suggests that this growth is centred largely 
on Apia and hence needs to be funded from 
something other than the export of goods, 
since agriculture, fishing and manufacturing 
are the main providers of goods exports and 
these sectors are declining.
Employment and prices
The trend in formal employment largely 
tells a similar story to the real GDP figures, 
with a long period of expansion that came 
to an end a full year before the effects of 
the GFC hit the labour market (Figure 2). 
Between the June quarter of 1998 and the 
September quarter of 2007, just more than 
4,000 formal-sector jobs were added to 
the Samoan economy. With the exception 
of some volatility about 2002, this rise 
in formal employment was largely on a 
smooth upward trend. Overall, this decade 
of rising employment from 1998 reflected 
a growth rate of 0.5 per cent per quarter, 
implying a doubling in formal employment 
every 35 years. While this might appear 
to be a slow growth rate, it matches the 
population growth rate recorded between 
the 2001 Census and the 2006 Census (SBS 
2008).
Approximately one-half of the decade-
long employment increase was undone in 
the two years after September 2007, when 
approximately 2,000 jobs were lost. There 
has been minimal employment growth 
since the recent low point in June 2009. 
Figure 2 Formal employment in Samoa
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One factor that could undermine future 
employment increases such as those seen 
between 1998 and 2007 is that several of the 
major donor-funded construction projects, 
such as the new government office building 
and convention centre in Apia and the new 
Ministry of Health headquarters, now have 
almost no impact on the local labour market. 
The reason is that the donor—the Chinese 
government in this case—is also importing 
the workforce (from China) along with most 
of the non-labour inputs. This model of 
donor-funded projects can best be thought 
of as a shock to the physical-capital stock of 
the country, with almost no direct impacts 
on production or employment.
The target inflation rate in Samoa is for 
consumer price index (CPI) increases to be 
no higher than 3–4 per cent per annum. 
This target has been breached for most of 
the period under review (Figure 3). The 
annual average rate of CPI change increased 
from 5 per cent in 2006–07 to 14 per cent in 
2008–09. Some of the very high inflation in 
2008 reflected high world commodity prices, 
especially for food and fuel—although these 
were quickly reversed after the GFC in late 
2008. At least some of the high inflation, 
however, also reflects a rapid expansion of 
credit to the private sector, which had a year-
on-year rate of change that peaked at almost 
30 per cent in late 2006 (IMF 2010).
The inflation rate fell sharply in 2009–10, 
and for several months the CPI was lower 
than it had been 12 months earlier. Whether 
this low rate of inflation can be maintained—
in the face of expansionary conditions from 
the projected large balance-of-payments 
Figure 3 Annual inflation rate (per cent) and average exchange rate (ST per US$)
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deficits during the tsunami recovery—
remains to be seen. As of November 2010, 
food prices are again rising rapidly in world 
markets, with a profile similar to that seen in 
early 2008 when staple food prices tripled in 
some countries. It will require considerable 
discipline for monetary policy to maintain 
low inflation in this environment.
The volatile inflation rates over the 
period under review did not cause any 
fundamental realignment in the value of 
the tala (Figure 3). Relative to the US dollar, 
the tala traded at average prices that varied 
from ST2.6 to ST2.9 per US$1. This stability 
suggests that, despite the substantial shocks 
the Samoan economy has weathered, the 
basket peg exchange rate regime remains 
credible. It is, however, not known to 
what extent the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate is responsible for the poor 
recent performance of goods exports. This 
real exchange rate appreciation has resulted 
from the combination of a relatively stable 
nominal exchange rate and more rapid 
inflation in Samoa than elsewhere.
The external sector
Samoa’s merchandise exports over the past 
five years have contributed an average of just 
4.7 per cent to real GDP, and in the most recent 
two years are contributing just 3 per cent of 
GDP. The most recent fiscal year figures from 
the Central Bank of Samoa suggest that in 
the 2009–10 fiscal year, exports were worth 
just ST30 million (on a free-on-board basis). 
In contrast, merchandise imports cost ST650 
million, which is equivalent to 50 per cent of 
GDP.
Hence, a point of continuity with the 
previous economic survey of Samoa is that 
the balance-of-payments structure continues 
to feature persistent trade deficits and a high 
dependence on current account receipts 
from tourism services and private transfers 
(remittances). The current account balance 
deteriorated substantially from 2007 onwards, 
coinciding with the temporary boost to 
economic activity from construction and 
the South Pacific Games (Table 1 and Figure 
1). The 2006–07 current account deficit was 
equivalent to 10 per cent of GDP, although it 
was reduced sharply in 2008–09 (Table 1).
Table 1 Samoa: balance of payments, 2004–05 to 2008–09 (ST million)
2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09
Exports (fob) 35 30 31 32 28
Imports (cif) 465 550 617 593 626
Trade balance –430 –520 –585 –561 –598
Net services 110 169 201 127 227
Net transfers 260 288 256 293 314
Current account balance –60 –62 –128 –140 –58
Capital account (net) 149 70 125 55 95
Overall balance 89 7 –3 –86 38
Sources: Central Bank of Samoa (CBS), various years (a). Balance of Payments, Central Bank of Samoa, Apia; and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010. Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC.
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The balance-of-payments projections 
for 2009–10 and 2010–11 recently published 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2010) as part of its consultations with the 
Government of Samoa have, however, 
estimated that the current account deficits 
will be equivalent to 20 per cent of GDP in 
those two years. Less than one-quarter of 
the projected deficit on the current account 
in those years is forecast to be due to the 
tsunami-related reconstruction, which is 
estimated to contribute approximately 
US$25 million to the deficit in each of 
2009–10 and 2010–11 (IMF 2010). Another 
component of the forecast deficit is predicted 
lower tourism demand; although as of 
September 2010, tourist arrivals had not 
declined sharply so the balance of payments 
situation might not deteriorate as much as 
projected.
According to estimates of the earnings 
from tourism made by the Central Bank, 
in fiscal year 2009–10, these earnings were 
worth ST300 million (CBS various years[b]). 
This amount represents a (nominal) decline 
of 6 per cent from tourism earnings in the 
2008–09 fiscal year, even though the number 
of tourist arrivals was approximately 4 per 
cent higher—at 131,000—for the 2009–10 
year. Over the past seven years, the number 
of tourist arrivals has grown at an average 
annual rate of 5.7 per cent. Whether this 
healthy increase will translate into rising 
earnings from tourism depends on whether 
the average expenditure per tourist can 
be maintained, which was not the case in 
2009–10, when average expenditures fell 9 
per cent compared with 2008–09. Whether 
the decline in spending per tourist is due to 
the impact of the tsunami is unknown.
The other major source of finance 
helping to maintain balance in the face of 
the very large merchandise trade deficit is 
private remittances. According to estimates 
made by the Central Bank, in fiscal year 
2009–10, these remittances were worth 
ST347 million. This represented a (nominal) 
decline of 5 per cent from remittances in the 
2008–09 fiscal year, which were estimated 
to be worth ST366 million. Remittances 
are a potentially volatile source of external 
finance, since they can be affected by shocks 
to the labour markets of the main countries 
where the Samoan diaspora is located 
(especially New Zealand, Australia and 
the United States), as well as responding to 
shocks in Samoa. To examine this volatility, 
the quarterly trends in remittance receipts 
from New Zealand, Australia, the United 
States and American Samoa are examined 
(Figure 4).
Since 2008, remittances from these four 
countries have contributed 93 per cent of 
total remittances received in Samoa (37 per 
cent from New Zealand, 26 per cent from 
Australia, 24 per cent from the United States, 
and 6 per cent from American Samoa). The 
source of remittances is shifting increasingly 
to Australia and New Zealand and away 
from the United States, American Samoa, 
and all other sources. In tala terms, the 
trend rate of increase in remittances from 
New Zealand is 2.9 per cent per quarter 
(implying a doubling every six years) and 
from Australia the trend rate of increase 
is 2.6 per cent per quarter. The tala value 
of remittances from the United States and 
American Samoa has been static.
Another feature of the remittance trends 
in Figure 4 is the response to the tsunami 
that they reveal. To interpret the data on 
this response correctly, it must be noted 
that the December quarter always has 
higher remittances, particularly from New 
Zealand. This is due mainly to events in 
the Christmas period, which can see more 
money sent but also has Samoans coming 
home and exchanging cash in Samoa and 
this is recorded as a remittance. But it also 
reflects White Sunday in October, when 
many remittances for church fund-raising 
occur. Notwithstanding that pattern, there 
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was a remarkable response to the tsunami 
by Samoan remitters in New Zealand: ST15 
million more was received in remittances 
from New Zealand in the December quarter 
of 2009 than in either of the surrounding 
quarters, and ST9 million more than in the 
same quarter of 2008.
There were also significant responses 
from remittances in Australia and the 
United States, although they were not as 
large either absolutely or proportionately 
as the remittance response from New 
Zealand. In total, across the four countries 
examined in Figure 4, remittance receipts 
in the December quarter of 2009 were 
approximately ST25 million more than the 
remittances in either quarter immediately 
before or after, or in comparison with the 
December quarter of 2008. The network of 
overseas Samoans providing remittances 
therefore appears to provide a response to 
natural disasters in Samoa that is both rapid 
and extremely large.
Another potential source of volatility in 
remittance earnings comes from the growing 
integration of seasonal labour markets in the 
form of New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal 
Employer (RSE) scheme and Australia’s 
Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme 
(PSWPS).1 Samoa is providing more than 
1,000 workers per annum under the New 
Zealand RSE scheme. On average, workers 
in the RSE scheme remit or repatriate 
approximately NZ$5,000 per season (Gibson 
and McKenzie 2010), so this suggests a net 
input to the Samoan economy of about ST9 
million per annum in the aggregate.
Figure 4 Quarterly remittances (and time trends)
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Samoa was, however, the supplying 
country that was most badly affected by the 
reduction in demand for Pacific seasonal 
workers in New Zealand in 2009–10. 
Calculations by Bedford and Bedford (2010) 
suggest that between 2008–09 and 2009–10 
there was a reduction of 23 per cent in the 
number of Samoan seasonal workers hired, 
compared with reductions of about 10 per 
cent for Tongans and ni-Vanuatu. One reason 
was that about two-thirds of the Samoan 
seasonal workers, but only one-third of the 
workers from other Pacific countries, were 
employed in the Hawkes Bay region, and 
this particular region had a large number 
of unemployed New Zealanders, which 
made it difficult for the RSE employers 
there to recruit migrants.2 Thus, even though 
the integration of regional labour markets 
provides great benefits to Samoa and other 
Pacific countries, it does mean exposure to 
a new source of volatility.
Government finances
The target for fiscal policy in Samoa is for the 
overall fiscal balance (including grants) to be 
between –3.5 and +3.5 per cent of GDP. But 
from the 2008–09 fiscal year onwards, this 
target has not been met and is not forecast 
to be met for several years. Preliminary 
estimates suggest that the overall fiscal 
balance was equivalent to –3.8 per cent of 
GDP in 2008–09, and is forecast to be a deficit 
equivalent to about 10 per cent of GDP in the 
following two years. The expansionary fiscal 
stance reflects several factors—only some of 
which are due to the increased expenditure 
to support reconstruction following the 
September 2009 tsunami (Table 2).
With respect to government revenue 
and grants, tax revenue as a share of GDP is 
fairly stable—typically equivalent to about 
22 per cent of GDP. External grants are more 
volatile—equivalent to about 7 per cent of 
GDP in 2005–06 and 2007–08, which in each 
of these two years was an increase over the 
previous year by an amount equivalent to 
1.5–2 per cent of GDP. The biggest increase 
in grants was in 2009–10, when the addition 
of tsunami-related grants equivalent to 5 per 
cent of GDP pushed the total contribution 
of external grants to an amount equivalent 
to 15 per cent of GDP.
There has been a general increase in 
recurrent government expenditure as a share 
of GDP, due in part to earlier public-sector 
wage increases. Development expenditures 
had a short-term peak in 2006–07 in the 
lead-up to the South Pacific Games, but are 
forecast to have had a much larger peak 
in 2009–10 at a level that is equivalent to 
more than one-fifth of GDP. Only a small 
part (equivalent to about 4 per cent of GDP 
in each of 2009–10 and 2010–11) of this 
high level of development expenditure is 
due to tsunami-related expenses. Instead, 
ongoing public-sector projects such as 
telecommunications and postal reform and 
the Second Infrastructure Asset Management 
Project are contributing to this high level of 
development expenditure.
Poverty and regional inequality
A recent analysis of the 2008 Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (SBS 
and UNDP 2010) provides a food poverty 
line of ST31.56 per capita per week as the 
cost of buying a ‘model diet’ designed by 
nutritional experts for the Samoan context. 
This diet is made up of (largely imported) 
store-bought foods, plus own production, 
gifts and purchases of local foods. The 
same diet cost ST24.68 in 2002 when the 
previous poverty estimates were made. One 
questionable feature of the food poverty 
line calculations is the assumption that food 
prices are the same in all areas of Samoa, 
since there is no attempt to price the model 
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diet in each region.3 In fact, imported foods 
are likely to be more expensive in Savaii 
and rural Upolu than they are elsewhere 
because of internal transport costs and the 
lower levels of local competition in those 
two regions than in the more economically 
dense Apia and Northwest Upolu areas.
The recent poverty study also created 
a ‘basic needs’ poverty line by adding an 
allowance for non-expenditure. To construct 
this allowance, the average level of actual 
non-food expenditure by households in 
the lowest three deciles in each of the four 
regions was used. This allowance varied 
from a high of ST28.39 per person per 
week in Apia to a low of ST17.90 in the 
rest of Upolu (outside Apia and Northwest 
Upolu). Putting the non-food allowance 
together with the food poverty line, the 
overall poverty line averaged ST53.59 per 
person per week across all four regions of 
Samoa. It was estimated that 27 per cent of 
the Samoan population had expenditure 
levels (including own-produced and gifted 
items) below this poverty line in 2008. The 
poverty line that had been estimated in 
2002, using similar methods, had 23 per cent 
of the population living below that level. 
Thus, poverty appears to have increased; 
however, no standard errors are reported, 
so this apparent increase in the head-count 
poverty rate could just reflect sampling 
variability.
With respect to the distribution of 
poverty, the joint SBS and UNDP (2010) 
report suggests that 24 per cent of the 
population in Apia, 27 per cent of those 
elsewhere in Upolu (that is, other than in 
Apia) and 29 per cent of the population 
of Savaii had weekly expenditure below 
the basic needs poverty line in 2008. 
These rates are slightly lower in Apia and 
Northwest Upolu than they were in 2002 
and considerably higher in the rest of 
Table 2 Structure of government financial operations, 2005–06 to 2010–11  
(percentage of GDP)
2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09P 2009–10F 2010–11F
Revenue and grants 31.8 36.4 30.9 32.0 39.5 33.7
Tax revenue 22.4 22.4 22.2 21.1 22.1 22.5
External grants 5.9 7.4 5.2 7.2 15.0 8.6
of which: tsunami-related n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.7 0.0
Expenditure and net 
lending
32.3 35.8 32.7 35.9 49.2 43.2
Current expenditure 24.1 25.0 25.7 23.2 27.1 28.1
Development expenditure 7.1 9.3 6.5 11.9 21.4 14.3
of which: tsunami-related 3.9 4.7
Overall fiscal balance –0.5 0.6 –1.8 –3.8 –9.7 –9.5
Overall balance (excluding 
grants)
–6.4 –6.7 –7.1 –11.1 –24.7 –18.1
n.a. not applicable 
P = preliminary 
F = forecast 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010. Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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Upolu and in Savaii (by about 10 percentage 
points).
The inference that poverty rates are 
much the same everywhere in Samoa 
other than in Apia could, however, reflect 
a weakness in the method used to form the 
poverty lines for each region. By creating 
reference groups for the non-food allowance 
as the poorest 30 per cent separately in each 
region, inter-regional differences in living 
standards are transmitted into the poverty 
lines. For example, if living standards at 
the thirtieth percentile of expenditure in 
Apia are higher than those at the thirtieth 
percentile in Savaii, the non-food allowance 
calculated for Apia will be higher—not 
necessarily because Apia is more expensive 
but because it refers to a higher standard of 
living than it does in Savaii.4 This violates 
the requirement for a poverty line to relate 
to the same basic-needs standard of living 
everywhere.
There are at least two empirical patterns 
that suggest a gap is emerging between the 
standard of living in Apia and Northwest 
Upolu, on the one hand, and that in Savaii 
and the rest of Upolu, on the other. First, 
internal migration patterns suggest that 
people are ‘voting with their feet’ by moving 
out of Savaii and the rest of Upolu and into 
Apia and Northwest Upolu. In the 2006 
Census, the enumerated population of Apia 
included a net 7,000 internal migrants (that 
is, after taking account of all inflows and 
outflows) who had been born elsewhere in 
Samoa, while Northwest Upolu had a net 
gain of 9,600 from internal migration. In 
contrast, Savaii had a net loss of 8,600 people 
moving to elsewhere in Samoa while the rest 
of Upolu had a net loss of 2,900 people to 
elsewhere in Samoa.
The second empirical pattern, which 
suggests higher living standards in Apia 
and Northwest Upolu, is revealed by the 
pattern of household budget allocations—
specifically the share of budgets (including 
self-produced and gifted items) devoted to 
food. These food budget shares are 31.4 and 
33.4 per cent in urban Apia and Northwest 
Upolu, respectively, but considerably higher 
in the rest of Upolu and Savaii—at 41.5 and 
39.7 per cent, respectively. These higher food 
shares suggest higher living standards in 
Apia and Northwest Upolu, in line with 
Engel’s law of declining food shares as 
consumers become richer. The similarity of 
food shares in Apia and Northwest Upolu 
was not apparent in 2002, when the previous 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
was fielded. Instead, in 2002, the average 
food shares in Northwest Upolu and the rest 
of Upolu were the same, while in Apia they 
were almost 10 percentage points lower.5
It therefore appears that there has 
been some convergence of average living 
standards in Northwest Upolu with the 
higher standards in Apia. Indeed, much 
of Northwest Upolu now appears as a 
continuation of the low-density, peri-urban 
settlement pattern of the Apia suburbs. 
This development is particularly marked 
along the coastal road to the Faleolo airport, 
and also inland from that road in the new 
settlements in the Faleata area west of Apia. 
In the 2006 Census, this particular area 
recorded the largest net internal migration 
gain of any Faipule (electoral district), with 
8,000 people living there who were born 
elsewhere in Samoa and only 1,600 people 
born there but living elsewhere in Samoa.
The impact of the tsunami
The tsunami that hit Samoa on 29 September 
2009 inflicted unprecedented damage on 
property and livelihoods, in addition to 
the deaths of 143 people and the injuries 
to more than 300 others. The report on the 
tsunami prepared by the Government of 
Samoa (GoS 2010) lists 850 households in 51 
villages as being directly affected. Of these 
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households, about 500 had their dwellings 
completely destroyed.
In addition, there was substantial 
damage to more than 50 beach fale tourism 
operators and half a dozen resorts, the loss 
of many fishing boats, and very substantial 
damage to public infrastructure (roads, water 
supply, electricity and telecommunications 
networks, seawalls, and wharfs). Estimates 
of the physical damage were in the order of 
US$60 million (10 per cent of GDP), while 
the post-tsunami recovery plan is estimated 
to cost just more than US$100 million (GoS 
2010).
The report on the tsunami by the 
Government of Samoa gives a detailed 
inventory of the relief assistance consigned 
to the government, with descriptions of 
the contents of each shipping container 
or package. There are also details on the 
technical assistance received from each 
donor, along with details of each donation 
to the relief and rehabilitation fund. But 
this is mainly an accounting approach 
to monitoring and evaluation, which is 
unlikely to yield the insights that would be 
expected from a more thorough economic 
evaluation of the disaster and recovery.
Among the key questions that could 
be answered with an economically focused 
and comprehensive monitoring and 
evaluation approach to the tsunami relief 
and reconstruction effort are
how much of the pledged aid was •	
delivered
of the delivered aid, how timely was •	
the delivery
of the delivered aid, how much reached •	
the affected region and how much 
stayed in Apia
of the aid that reached the affected •	
region, how much reached the neediest 
households
how large are the displacement effects •	
of the aid, at macro and micro levels, in 
terms of crowding-out private coping 
responses
how large are the incentive effects of the •	
aid in blunting investment responses to 
disaster risk?
Without understating the uniqueness 
of the tragedy and the human suffering, the 
September 2009 tsunami is an example of 
the kind of natural disaster to which Pacific 
island countries are highly vulnerable. 
It is therefore important to learn from 
the response to the tragedy so that relief 
and reconstruction responses to future 
disasters in the Pacific can be as useful as 
possible. The record in this respect is not 
good, with rumours of misappropriation of 
relief supplies following the Aitape, Papua 
New Guinea, tsunami in 1998 never able 
to be proven due to the lack of a formal 
monitoring effort. In the case of the food 
relief in Papua New Guinea following the 
1997 drought and frosts, most aid arrived 
too late to be of value and might have 
disrupted the replanting of staple foods 
in the affected villages (Whitecross and 
Franklin 2001). This observation of late 
delivery of aid comes, however, from the 
pattern of private-sector activity (rice sales) 
rather than from a formal monitoring and 
evaluation of the relief effort, since there 
was, once again, no such evaluation.
The absolute tragedy of an event such 
as the 2009 tsunami should not be deemed 
grounds for ignoring the contribution that 
level-headed research can make to extracting 
lessons for dealing with other disasters in 
future. For example, research on mental 
health among survivors in Sumatra after 
the Boxing Day 2004 tsunami (Frankenberg, 
et al. 2008) showed that it was feasible to 
trace and interview a very high proportion 
of people who had previously resided in 
the affected areas. This research showed 
that the tsunami produced post-traumatic 
stress reactions, which could be ameliorated 
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with counselling, not only among people 
directly affected but also among those living 
beyond the area of immediate impact. The 
broader research project that is monitoring the 
recovery effort after the Boxing Day tsunami 
also reveals the resiliency of the population, 
with much of the support in terms of money, 
goods and housing coming from existing 
social networks.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
efforts that focus just on the formal recovery 
support, such as that offered by donors, 
could tend to ignore these informal sources 
of support and thus fail to identify the truly 
vulnerable.
In case a future monitoring effort 
is undertaken to understand better the 
economic impacts of the September 2009 
tsunami and recovery, some baseline 
information is needed on the economic 
position of the population in the affected 
region before the disaster. Disaggregated 
estimates of annual household income 
and its components are available from the 
Samoa Labour Mobility Survey, which 
was fielded only 10 months before the 
tsunami struck. This survey was designed to 
examine the impact on Samoan households 
of participating in seasonal and settlement 
migration. But it also provides a good basis 
for making inter-regional comparisons and 
for giving an indication of the economic 
position of the population in the tsunami-
affected areas because it was fielded in 92 
villages through Samoa.
Total household income averaged 
almost ST21,500 per household per annum 
at the time of the labour mobility survey 
(Table 3). The highest average incomes were 
in Apia and Northwest Upolu and were 
approximately ST6,000 higher than in the 
other two regions. These data are consistent 
with the evidence of net population 
movement out of Savaii and the rest of Upolu 
and into Apia and Northwest Upolu, and 
are also consistent with the pattern of food 
budget shares.
Earnings were the largest component 
of household income—accounting for 
Table 3 Household income estimates for main regions of Samoa and for areas affected 
by the September 2009 tsunami (tala)
Earnings Ag/market  
income
Other  
income
Net  
remittance
Total  
income
Apia urban 18,082 750 745 2,484 24,046
Northwest Upolu 14,544 3,157 529 4,225 25,797
Rest of Upolu 6,046 4,457 638 2,839 18,589
Savaii 5,846 2,018 621 4,059 18,116
SAMOA 10,572 2,722 623 3,495 21,454
All tsunami-affected villages 4,597 2,292 628 3,503 15,613
Other 11,693 2,803 623 3,494 22,550
Tsunami-affected (10+ 
households)
5,905 1,879 663 2,086 14,825
Other 10,999 2,800 620 3,624 22,060
Note: Total income also includes the value of food that the household grew or caught. 
Source: Author’s calculation from Samoa Labour Mobility Survey data, with tsunami-affected areas shown in 
Figure 5.
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lower than the average for households in 
other areas of Samoa (Table 3). This gap 
was driven largely by lower earnings and 
by lower income from agriculture and 
informal-sector sales. Thus, it appears 
that the tsunami-affected villages were 
considerably poorer than the rest of Samoa 
and this must be borne in mind if subsequent 
surveys find that these villages remain 
poorer than average and attribute that to 
the tsunami or to an incomplete recovery 
and reconstruction effort.
Some villages contain only a few 
households affected by the tsunami, so as 
a robustness exercise the overlap between 
the group of tsunami-affected villages and 
the villages in the labour mobility survey 
was restricted to villages with at least 10 
households affected by the tsunami. This 
restriction resulted in a much smaller 
subset of just 52 households from the labour 
mobility survey in these seriously affected 
villages. The gap in average income between 
this group and the households in the rest 
of Samoa was, however, just the same as 
before—about ST7,000. Thus, it appears 
clear that the tsunami-affected area was 
considerably poorer than average and was 
a region of considerable out-migration. 
These patterns need to be kept in mind for 
any future evaluation of the success of the 
reconstruction effort.
Conclusions
For most of the decade from 1998 until 
2007 the Samoan economy enjoyed steady 
rates of growth in GDP and employment, 
along with prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies and a growing engagement with 
external labour markets. Reforms in 
several parts of the economy had been 
either initiated or completed and the 
competent governance of these reforms had 
provided useful demonstration effects on 
about one-half of the average, but being 
much less important in Savaii and the rest 
of Upolu. The net income from marketing 
crops, livestock, fish, handicraft activities, 
and other small-scale sales contributed 
just more than 12 per cent of total income, 
and was highest in the rest of Upolu. Net 
remittances—which take account of flows 
into and out of Samoa of both cash and 
goods—contributed just more than 16 per 
cent of total household income and were 
highest in Savaii at almost one-quarter of 
income. The other income component that is 
not reported in Table 3, but which is included 
in the totals, is household consumption of 
items that were produced or caught by the 
household. This source contributed just less 
than one-fifth of total household income, 
ranging from just more than 30 per cent in 
Savaii to just 8 per cent in Apia.
To establish which villages from the 
labour mobility survey were in the tsunami-
affected region, the geographic coordinates 
of the survey villages were obtained and 
compared with the coordinates of the affected 
villages. The list of 51 tsunami-affected 
villages comes from the Government of 
Samoa report, since not all villages along the 
south coast of Upolu were affected by the 
tsunami, and some villages in other regions 
were affected. To allow for the approximate 
size of each village, a map was drawn with 
a 2.5 km buffer around the centre of the 
affected villages, and any survey villages 
(shown in Figure 5 by a ×) in that buffer 
are considered part of the affected region 
(Figure 5).
This procedure identified 11 of the 
villages from the labour mobility survey, 
containing 98 surveyed households, as 
part of the tsunami-affected region. The 
remaining region contains 81 villages with 
522 surveyed households. These villages are 
not just along the south coast of Upolu. The 
average income of these households, prior 
to the tsunami, was approximately ST7,000 
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the feasibility of reform in other parts of the 
economy. Links with a key component of the 
Samoan economy—the Samoan diaspora 
overseas—had also been maintained or 
even strengthened due to reductions in 
the real cost of telecommunications and air 
transport, following the entry of private-
sector competitors into these markets.
The strengths exhibited by the Samoan 
economy during this period of steady 
growth have been tested since 2007 by 
considerable volatility in economic activity, 
declining employment, rapidly rising 
prices, and major external economic and 
geographic shocks. The conventional 
responses in many larger economies 
faced with such shocks—of increased 
indebtedness and fiscal adjustment along 
with a longer-term goal of promoting an 
export-led recovery—can be only partially 
transferred to the Samoan context. When 
goods exports are such a small share of 
overall economic activity—less than 5 
per cent—the scope for increased export 
competitiveness to stimulate the wider 
economy will be limited.
Instead, the key supports of the Samoan 
economy remain aid, remittances and 
tourism. The strength of these supports 
was tested in a very rigorous manner by 
the shocks of 2008 and 2009. In all cases, 
the supports to the economy of Samoa 
appeared to withstand these challenges. 
Nevertheless, some key questions about the 
Figure 5 Map of tsunami-affect areas and villages in the Samoa Labour Mobility Survey
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future viability of these supports remain, 
including
can Samoa continue to benefit from •	
donor engagement and competition, 
especially when models of aid delivery 
by some newly important donors 
result in positive shocks to stocks of 
public capital, such as government 
buildings, but have minimal impact on 
employment and economic activity
will  tourists continue to visit  a •	
destination that is vulnerable to natural 
disasters and that is becoming more 
expensive due to the real exchange rate 
appreciation created by a stable nominal 
currency and higher inflation than in 
several competitor countries
for how long will the Samoan diaspora •	
continue to remit and can technological 
developments introduce less-costly 
remittance services to maximise the 
development impact of the money sent 
to Samoa in case of future decay in the 
incidence or intensity of remitting by 
overseas Samoans?
Notes
1 Money that is remitted to Samoa by seasonal 
workers while they are in New Zealand is 
captured by the remittance statistics gathered 
by the Central Bank of Samoa. Money that 
is brought back by the worker might be 
captured in the statistics if it is converted to 
tala at banks in Samoa. If instead the New 
Zealand dollars are converted to tala in New 
Zealand, they would not be captured by 
the remittance statistics. Estimates from the 
Samoa Labour Mobility Survey suggest that 
there is a 3:2 ratio of money remitted rather 
than repatriated; but the place of conversion 
for repatriated earnings is not known.
2  The RSE scheme is a ‘New Zealanders 
first’ scheme. Seasonal employers must 
demonstrate that no New Zealanders are 
available for the work before their application 
to recruit RSE workers may be approved.
3 In an unnecessary complication, the per 
capita food poverty line is multiplied by the 
average household size in each region to 
create a region-specific household poverty 
line. Since larger households are poorer in 
per capita terms, there is always a systematic 
understatement of population-based poverty 
when results are presented in household 
terms. The 2008 poverty report uses both 
population-based and household-based 
poverty estimates, which is likely to be a 
source of future confusion.
4 The appropriate method would be to make 
a single reference group of the poorest 30 
per cent irrespective of which region they 
are from, and where, ideally, inter-regional 
differences in the cost of living have already 
been taken account of before the ranking 
that identifies the poorest 30 per cent. If the 
resulting poverty rate turns out to be much 
different than 30 per cent, the process should 
be repeated, taking the initial poverty rate 
estimate as the proportion to use for forming 
the reference population (Pritchett, et al. 
2001).
5 This comparison is based on Chart 6 of the 
report by SBS and UNDP (2010).
6 This observation is based on personal 
communications with Dr Jed Friedman of 
the World Bank.
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